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“At the end of the day, sports are a business,” - Taylor Dent1

Introduction

In August 2012, the Manchester United football club offered its stock publicly on the
New York Stock Exchange. By most accounts in the media, it was a terrible investment. And
yet, eight months out from the initial offering, the MANU stock has performed tremendously,
outperforming market benchmarks like the S&P 500 by a wide margin throughout 2013. By
utilizing U.S. legislation like the JOBS Act and options like the dual-class voting structure
available in the U.S., Manchester United was able to earn over $230 million without forfeiting
any significant control of the company. Manchester United’s success will encourage other sports
teams, both domestic and foreign, to go public in the U.S. as well.
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Only a small minority of sports teams in the United States are currently directly traded on
a public stock market.2 Instead, most are owned by privately-held corporations, publicly-quoted
corporations or unincorporated partnerships that have a few investors.3 At first glance, the
difference between a publicly traded team (sometimes called a “stock market team”4) and a team
owned by a publicly traded company may seem negligible. After all, in both cases stock is
traded on a public market and owned by numerous diverse investors. However, consider the
following example: the Anaheim Mighty Ducks5 hockey team was owned for many years by
Walt Disney Corporation, a publicly traded company.6 Yet, the Ducks cannot be considered a
stock market team because “neither fans nor investors will see much correlation between the
corporations in question and the teams in question.”7 Buying Disney stock would not give the
investor any sense of control over the sports team, as it was just one of many Disney
subsidiaries.8 Conversely, investors of a stock market team can have a direct effect on the
management of the franchise.
Sports teams considering an initial public offering (IPO) face numerous deterrents. Most
U.S. major sports leagues have rules in place to prevent or at least hinder efforts to go public.9

2

Brian Cheffins, Sports Teams and The Stock Market: A Winning Match? 32 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 271, 272
(1998).
3
Id. at 272.
4
Robert Bacon, Initial Public Offerings and Professional Sports Teams: The Regulations Work, But Are Owners
and Investors Listening?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 139, 147, n.24 (2000).
5
When the team was sold in 2005, the name was changed to Anaheim Ducks. Anaheim's Ducks decide to drop
'Mighty' from name, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Jan. 27, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2308588.
6
Cheffins, supra note 2, at 273.
7
Id.
8
“For professional sports franchises with general corporate ownership, both financial performance and performance
on the field will barely register when it comes to the financial results of the parent company.” Ryan Schaffer, A
Piece of the Rock (or The Rockets): The Viability of Widespread Public Offerings of Professional Sports Franchises,
5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 201, 205 (2006). Other examples of teams owned by publicly traded companies include:
the Chicago Cubs, owned by the Tribute Company; the Los Angeles Dodgers, owned by Rubert Murdoch’s News
Corp.; the Philadelphia 76ers and Philadelphia Flyers owned by Comcast Corporation; the New York Knicks and
New York Rangers, owned by Cablevision Systems; the Atlanta Thrashers, Atlanta Hawks, and Atlanta Braves,
owned by AOL Time Warner; and the Anaheim Angels, which were also owned by Walt Disney Corporation. Id.
9
See generally Cheffins, supra note 2.
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The actual earnings from Sports IPOs tend to be less than initially anticipated.10 Once public,
teams may also have to disclose financial information, which can create tension between “on the
field” success and financial success. Yet those teams that decide to go public do obtain some
distinct advantages. Although the IPOs typically do not earn as much as is initially forecasted,
average proceeds are often in the multi-millions of dollars,11 which can be used to build new
stadiums, renovate older stadiums, pay players’ salaries and contribute to operating costs.
Additionally, in the U.S., many sports teams can take advantage of decreased disclosure
requirements as well as the ability to retain nearly all of the ownership stock and voting control
through certain voting structures.
On August 10, 2012, the Manchester United Football Club (Manchester United) of
Manchester, England, owned by the Glazer family, conducted a much-publicized IPO on the
New York Stock Exchange.12 The price of the initial offering was set at $14, much lower than
the estimated $16-20 range that had been initially forecasted.13 The offering consisted of 16.6
million shares14 and earned the club a total of $233 million, far below the anticipated $1 billion
the club had hoped to earn from the IPO.15 There was also much negative media coverage

10

Bacon, supra note 4, at 140.
For example, the Manchester United IPO earned $233 million. Ajay Makan, “Chaotic IPO will leave Glazers
satisfied” Financial Times, (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31edc158-0191-11e2-81ba00144feabdc0.html#ixzz27c7NkArz. The most recent Green Bay Packer IPO sold over 268,000 shares at $250 a
piece, which is roughly $67 million.
“Community, Shareholders” Green Bay Packers,
http://www.packers.com/community/shareholders.html [hereinafter GB Packers Community, Shareholders].
12
Makan, supra note 11.
13
See Chris Smith, Manchester United IPO: History Says Don’t Buy, FORBES, (Aug. 10, 2012)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/08/10/manchester-united-ipo-history-says-dont-buy/; Makan, supra
note 11; Travis Hoium, Manchester United's IPO Misses Wide Left, AOL DAILY FINANCE, 8/14/12,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/08/14/manchester-united-ipo-misses-wide-left/.
14
Smith, supra note 13.
15
Makan, supra note 11.
11
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surrounding the offering leading up to the sale, regarding the financial soundness of an
investment in Manchester United.16
Although the IPO was touted as a way for the team to reduce the large amount of debt
being carried by the franchise,17 only approximately half of the proceeds from the IPO were be
used to pay down Manchester United’s debt,18 a decision that was remarked upon quite harshly
from fans and investors alike.19 The rest of the proceeds, $110 million, went directly to the
Glazer family itself as profit.20 By going public in the U.S., Manchester United also qualified as
an Emerging Growth Company under the recent U.S. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(JOBS Act) of 2012 and therefore was not subject to the standard disclosure requirements faced
by most publicly traded companies in the U.S. Numerous other corporations made the move to
go public in 2012 as well; however, not all were eligible for the advantages offered by the JOBS
Act.

Roger
Bennett,
Great
club
…
terrible
investment?,
ESPN,
(Aug.
2,
2012),
http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/story/_/id/8227588/manchester-united-ipo-great-american-swindle-roger-bennett;
Hoium, supra note 13; Smith, supra note 13.
17
In 2005, the Glazer family conducted a leveraged buyout of Manchester United, costing £790 million or almost
$1.5 billion and saddled the franchise with debt. Glazer wins control of Man United, BBC NEWS, 5/12/2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4540939.stm. See also Michael Moritz, Manchester United opens window on
murky
world
of
leveraged
buy-outs,
THE
TELEGRAPH,
1/27/2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7083750/Manchester-United-opens-window-onmurky-world-of-leveraged-buy-outs.html.
18
This arrangement was stated within the Manchester United Prospectus, which noted that half of the shares would
be sold by the “selling shareholder” as known as the Glazer Family:
In this offering, we are selling 8,333,334 Class A ordinary shares and the selling shareholder
named in this prospectus is selling 8,333,333 Class A ordinary shares. In connection with the sale
by us, our net proceeds from the sale of our Class A ordinary shares in this offering at the initial
public offering price of $14.00 per share will be approximately $110.3 million, after deducting
estimated underwriting discounts and commissions. … We will not receive any proceeds from
the sale of any Class A ordinary shares by the selling shareholder.
Manchester
United
Prospectus,
SEC
Filings,
42,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1549107/000104746912008161/a2210672z424b4.htm
[HEREINAFTER Manchester United Prospectus].
19
Mark Potter, Manchester United fans group slams Glazers’ IPO plan, REUTERS, (July 31, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/us-manchesterunited-ipo-fans-idUSBRE86U0DC20120731.
See also
Makan, supra note 11.
20
Makan, supra note 11.
16
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Although the fans may disagree, from the Glazer family’s perspective the IPO was a
success. The Glazers walked away with $110 million in their pockets, reduced the debts of
Manchester United by a similar amount, and gave up merely 2% of the voting share of the
company.21 Even though there will be administrative fees down the road as a result of having
shareholders, these costs will almost certainly be paid for by the company, rather than by the
Glazers.22
This article will argue that sports franchises that decide to IPO will do so in the U.S., as
demonstrated by the recent Manchester United IPO. Part I will discuss why sports teams choose
to go public. Part II will examine the JOBS Act of 2012 and the impact it can have on sports
IPOs. Part III will offer a discussion on the dual-class voting structure available in U.S. markets
and the advantages of such a structure to sports teams. Part IV will survey the changing
landscape of league restrictions in the U.S., including charges of antitrust violations. Finally,
Part V will provide a review of the early market reaction to the Manchester United stock. This
article will show that the advantages of the U.S. Market as utilized by Manchester United
indicate that sports teams looking to go public in the future will choose to do so in the U.S.

I.

Why Sports Teams Go Public

There are numerous risks and rewards that result from an IPO for stock market teams.
Teams can go public to relieve debt pressures, secure funding for stadiums and players, and
provide exit options for owners. In the case of Manchester United, the team’s need to relieve
debt pressures was even greater due to the introduction of the Union of European Football
21

Bennett, supra note 16.
This is solely my opinion based on the fact that the Glazers purchased Manchester United by conducting a
leveraged buyout, placing on the risk and debt from the sale on the team rather than the owners as well as the
decision to keep half of the IPO proceeds even though Manchester United’s debt exceeds £400mil. See Manchester
United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 29.
22
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Associations (UEFA) Financial Fair Play Rules. The downsides associated with going public
include concerns about whether winning will take priority over financial success, legal disclosure
obligations, and league restrictions with regard to public offerings.

a. Advantages to Going Public for Sports Teams
The ability to offer stock on a public market can provide sports teams with a potentially
huge source of funding.23 Sports teams will sometimes pursue a public offering to raise funds
for stadiums.24 Although the need to pay for stadiums out of the team’s pocket is typically
considered a European problem,25 as North American cities have historically been willing to
subsidize the cost of the stadium to keep the team in the city,26 times may be changing.27 A
growing number of cities in the U.S. have become either unwilling or unable to provide teams
with the funding for new stadiums or even renovations to older stadiums.28 Although the
economy is beginning to slowly recover from the recession of 2008, cities may not be so quick to
return to their pre-recession habits of funding multi-million dollar stadium projects and may

23

While a majority of the funding for sports teams in U.S. comes from local ticket sales and broadcast fees, these
sources of funding are not easy to increase. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 202-03. Going public provides a creative
source of additional capital. Id. Many major sports teams have encountered financial difficulties over the years that
could be abated by a public offering of stock. For example, eighteen of thirty NHL teams posted a loss in the 20102011 season. If the five top-earning teams are removed from the calculations, the remaining twenty-five NHL teams
lost $86 million during the 2010-2011 season. This disparity in wealth throughout the league was a driving factor
behind the most recent lockout in the 2012-2013 season. Kurt Badenhausen, The NHL’s Problem: Only Three
Teams
Are
Making
Real
Money,
FORBES,
(Sept.
18,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2012/09/18/nhl-lockout-is-all-about-the-benjamins-and-who-doesnthave-them/.
24
Bacon, supra note 4, at 140-42. European teams also may need to IPO to raise funds for player salaries and costs.
Cheffins argues this is a result of a lack of “farm leagues,” drafts, free agency, and trades in the U.K. as well as the
“transfer fees” that must be paid when a team acquires a player from another team. Cheffins, supra note 2, at 276.
North American teams don’t have to make these “one-off” cash outlays. Id.
25
U.K. teams typically use the floatation proceeds to build and improve stadiums. This is because the stadiums are
owned by the teams in the U.K., versus in the U.S. where the cities typically own the stadiums. Cheffins, supra note
2, at 275.
26
3 of 4 U.S. “stock market teams” have not used their IPOs to build stadiums. Bacon, supra note 4, at 153.
27
See Bacon, supra note 4, at 143.
28
Bacon, supra note 4, at 143.
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continue to refuse or limit sports teams’ access to public funds.29 If this source of funding dries
up, North American teams may find it necessary to go public to finance construction on their
own.30 Alternatively, if teams are forced to expend internal funds for stadiums, they may find
they lack the ability to pay player’s salaries and thereby look to go public for that reason.
Although many companies that go public may cite debt concerns as a motivating factor,
debt control has become a forefront issue for football clubs in Europe. In 2010, UEFA passed
the Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules which will govern the allowable debt that can be carried by a
club participating in UEFA competitions.31 Because clubs earn large amounts from participating
in and even more for winning UEFA competitions,32 clubs will not break these rules lightly.33
UEFA has stressed that the provisions are not “anti-debt”; so long as the clubs can service their

“Jockeying between major sports franchises and governments over the financing of new stadiums is nothing new,
but the chilly reception the Atlanta proposal has gotten from the public and many state lawmakers is surprising some
in this business-friendly state . . . Similar dynamics are playing out in Miami and Birmingham, Ala., as fans and
taxpayers appear to be more circumspect about spending public money on stadiums used primarily by privately
owned teams.” Bill Barrow, In Ga., Stadium Opposition Signals Public Shift, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Jan. 19, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/ga-stadium-opposition-signals-public-shift-18258244.
30
We already see an example of this with the Green Bay Packers. Because the team had already issued stock
publicly before the NFL banned the practice, the team was grandfathered in and allowed to continue. Proceeds from
Green Bay’s two most recent public offerings in 1997 and 2011 have been used to build or renovate Lambeau Field,
where the Packers play.
Andrew Brandt, Buying A Piece of the Packers, FORBES, 12/8/11
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/12/08/buying-a-piece-of-the-packers/.
The IPO in 1923 and
offering in 1935 were used to bail the team out of financial difficulties, while the 1950 offering was used to
reclassify stock in order to limit the amount of shares an individual shareholder could hold. Shareholder History &
Financial History, Green Bay Packers, http://prod.static.packers.clubs.nfl.com/assets/docs/2011shareholderhistory.pdf [hereinafter GB Packers Shareholder History].
31
Ryan Murphy, Playing Fair in the Boardroom: An Examination of the Corporate Structures of European Football
Clubs, 19 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L. J. INT’L L. 409, 413 (2010-2011).
32
Clubs
Benefit
from
Champions
League
Revenue,
UEFA,
(June
13,
2012),
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/management/finance/news/newsid=1840934.html. Many of the clubs that will be most
limited by these rules pushed for their implementation. Owners of major football franchises like Chelsea F.C., are
concerned by the trending of continually training to outdo other teams and have asked UEFA to “save them from
themselves.” Daniel Geey, The UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules: A Difficult Balancing Act, 9 ESLJ 50 (2011).
33
There is a question of whether UEFA will actual ban a team that violates the FFP rules from competitions.
However, club may be unwilling to risk the possibility of being excluded from UEFA competitions. UEFA has
banned teams in the past for failing to comply with its rules. Owen Gibson, Manchester City and PSG cannot
‘cheat’
financial
fair
play,
Uefa
warns,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(Feb.
4,
2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2013/feb/04/manchester-city-financial-fair-play (“[UEFA General Secretary
Gianni] Infantino pointed to the fact that Uefa has excluded 34 clubs from competition under its existing rules,
including Besiktas and Málaga, as evidence it would not hesitate to act if required.”).
29
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debt, FFP rules will not be implicated.34 However, if the team’s profits cannot cover their
interest payments on the debt, clubs will have reason to be concerned about the FFP rules.35
An important aspect of the FFP rules is the “break-even requirement” which states that
“UEFA determines that a club has broken even for the year when the relevant expenses exceed
the relevant income by less than €5 million for the prior year.”36 These regulations will be
phased in between 2012 and 2014.37 As they are phased in, Manchester United will have to be
more diligent about servicing its debt load than it was previously required to be.38 Because
participants and winners earn significant payouts from UEFA competitions,39 as well as bragging
rights, elimination from the competitions would disappoint Manchester United’s fans and cost
the team millions of pounds in revenue.

34

Geey, supra note 32, at 51. This distinction was implemented for clubs like Manchester United in particular, that
carry a very large debt load.
35
Id. For a discussion on how Manchester United has been working to increase its revenue since the IPO, see supra
Section V.
36
Murphy, supra note 31, at 414. This change will be gradual – beginning with a €45 million gap for the 2013/14
and 2014/15 seasons, decreases to €30 million for 2015/16 and 2016/17 seasons, and will continue until it gets to €5
million. Id. at 414 (citing UEFA Fair Play Regulations art. 61). UEFA recently issued warnings to two clubs,
Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain, that they will not be allowed to cheat the FFP rules. This warning stems
from the fact that neither team would have passed the break-even test if it had been in place this year. These two
teams are not alone – in fact, forty-six other clubs would failed the break-even test as well. Gibson, supra note 33.
37
“The UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, which were approved in May 2010 after an
extensive consultation period and updated in the 2012 edition, are being implemented over a three-year period, with
clubs participating in UEFA club competitions having their transfer and employee payables monitored since the
summer of 2011, and the break-even assessment covering the financial years ending 2012 and 2013 to be assessed
during
2013/14.”
Financial
Fair
Play,
Union
of
European
Football
Associations
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/index.html.
38
Teams, including Manchester United, Liverpool, Tottenham Hotspur and Arsenal, are pushing for the FFP rules to
be implemented outside of UEFA competitions in the Premier League, which is the top football league in Britain.
Sunni Upal, Bring in Financial Fair Play! Liverpool Urge Premier League to Adopt UEFA's Tough Regulations,
DAILYMAIL, (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2263861/Liverpool-urge-PremierLeague-adopt-UEFAs-Financial-Fair-Play-regulations.html.
39
In the UEFA Champions League alone, “€754.1m prize money [is] allotted to the 32 teams who figured from the
group stage onwards consisted of €413m in fixed amounts plus €341.1m from the market pool. All of the 32
participating clubs received a minimum €7.2m in accordance with the distribution system, comprising a
participation bonus of €3.9m and €3.3m from the six €550,000 match bonuses given per group game. Additionally,
performance bonuses were paid in the group stage: sides received €800,000 for every win and €400,000 for every
draw, with Madrid the only club to net the maximum €4.8m. The 16 clubs that reached the round of 16 were each
assigned an additional €3m, the eight quarter-finalists an extra €3.3m, and the four semi-finalists a bonus of €4.2m.”
“Clubs Benefit from Champions League revenue.” Geey, supra note 32.
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Interestingly, many of the clubs that will be most limited by these rules are actually the
same clubs pushing for their implementation.40 Although at first glance it may seem odd that
these major franchises would request to be limited by outside forces, it actually makes a great
deal of sense. Owners of major football franchises are concerned by the trend of continually
trying to outdo and outspend other teams and have asked UEFA to “save them from
themselves.”41 This fear of being outspent by a rival franchise may have deterred sports teams
from going public, where the team would be more limited as they tried to balance their books
and uphold their fiduciary duties to shareholders.42 With the implementation of the FFP rules,
clubs will no longer be able to continually outspend one another, allowing those that chose it to
pursue the benefits of public offerings.
As the American public becomes more aware of debt and financial practices as a result
of the recession, provisions such as the FFP Rules could be on the horizon in the U.S. If the FFP
rules achieve UEFA’s goals of improving football standards in Europe, protecting the integrity of
UEFA competitions, improving the transparency, economic and financial capabilities, and
credibility of clubs, among other things,43 law makers, league officials and fans alike may look

40

Geey, supra note 32.
Id.
42
“Those [teams] that do try to balance the books are hard-pressed to win bidding wars for players against owners
who want success at all costs: free-spending Manchester City, for example, is owned by Mansour bin Zayed Al
Nahyan, an Emirati sheikh.” Losing Their Shirts: Do Sports and Stockmarkets Mix?, THE ECONOMIST, Sports
Investments, (Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21562207.
43
“Article 2 – Objectives. 1 These regulations aim: a) to further promote and continuously improve the standard of
all aspects of football in Europe and to give continued priority to the training and care of young players in every
club; b) to ensure that clubs have an adequate level of management and organisation; c) to adapt clubs’ sporting
infrastructure to provide players, spectators and media representatives with suitable, well-equipped and safe
facilities; d) to protect the integrity and smooth running of the UEFA club competitions; e) to allow the development
of benchmarking for clubs in financial, sporting, legal, personnel, administrative and infrastructure-related criteria
throughout Europe.
2 Furthermore, they aim to achieve financial fair play in UEFA club competitions and in particular: a) to improve
the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their transparency and credibility; b) to place the
necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with players,
social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually; c) to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football
finances; d) to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; e) to encourage responsible spending
41
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towards enacting similar provisions in the U.S.44 If that happens, sports teams may have to
quickly balance their debts and equities, a feat that can be accomplished through a public
offering.45
There is another motivating factor at play in sports IPOs that is not typically found in
average IPOs – the effect of fans. This “fan investor” desires the team’s stock not because it is
necessarily a financially-sound investment, but because the fan wishes to own part of the team.46
As a result, share prices can be driven up far higher than the team’s financials would initially
suggest, encouraging sports teams to conduct a public offering. Robert Bacon rejects the idea of
the fan effect, arguing that investors have taken notice of sports’ stocks poor performance and
will not invest, as evidenced by the IPO of the Green Bay Packers in 1997, the proceeds of which
fell short of initial predictions.47 However, Bacon is mistaken. It is important to note that
although the Green Bay Packers might have aimed much higher, they did in fact raise $24
for the long-term benefit of football; f) to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club
football.” UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations, Edition 2012, UEFA.
44
If the trend in the UK football leagues is any indication, U.S. teams themselves may request the leagues to impose
these rules.
45
See Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales, Why DO Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis, 53
J. OF FIN. 27, 29 (1998) (“Independent companies are more likely to go public after major investments and abnormal
growth. The IPO is followed by a reduction in leverage and investment. So their decision to go public can be
interpreted as an attempt to rebalance their balance sheet after larger investment and growth.”). This study finds that
the equity capital raised from an IPO is typically used to reduce leverage rather than finance new growth and
investment. The Manchester United IPO fits this model well. These findings would also seem to indicate that the
JOBS Act’s goal of job creation through IPOs from EGCs might be unrealistic.
46
Investors receive “emotional satisfaction” from the purchase and stock certificates can serve as conversation
pieces. Bacon, supra note 4, at 153; Schaffer, supra note 8 at 222 (“Some of the most important benefits for a faninvestor are psychic rather than tangible. It is the feeling of ownership of a treasured civic asset, of being
part of the history and tradition of the team that they love. … Often, there is additional psychic pleasure in
being able to pass on that membership to family members and friends. The same fan passed up the t-shirt and game
ball when buying his fifteen-year-old son a birthday gift, instead buying him fifteen shares of the Boston Celtics,
stating: ‘I hope he'll never sell it because it's sentimental.’”).
47
Bacon, supra note 4 at 148. Bacon argues that fans should buy memorabilia instead. Id. at 165. Another aspect
of the Green Bay Packers’ IPOs that supports the fan effect idea is the location of shareholders. In the 1997-98
stock sale, 120,010 shares were sold, with 64,300 to Wisconsin residents, 9600 to Illinois residents, 4300 to
Minnesota residents and 2800 to Michigan residents. Genevieve F.E. Birren, NFL vs. Sherman Act: How the NFL's
Ban on Public Ownership Violates Federal Antitrust Laws, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 121, 130 (2004) (citing Packers
Stock and Financial History, available at http://www.packers.com/history/stock_history/). This amounts to over
2/3rds of the shares were purchased by residents who live geographically close to Green Bay Wisconsin and have a
higher likelihood of being fans of the Packers. However, it is also important to note that the Green Bay Packers also
focused their marketing efforts towards people in the local area. Id.
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million in the 1997 public offering while giving nothing to shareholders beyond a certificate and
personal satisfaction.48 Furthermore, the Green Bay Packers have continued to offer stock since
Bacon’s prediction, with a very successful offering in 2011.49
Finally, it is well known that Manchester United managed to raise $233 million from its
IPO, even if those earnings were far below initial projected numbers.50 It did so without giving
up significant voting rights.51 This suggests that perhaps some savvy investors avoided the
Manchester United IPO and instead the sale was driven by fans, violating Bacon’s prediction.52
Even though various news outlets have repeatedly cautioned investors against sports IPOs,53 the
fact that the sales continue to earn millions of dollars seems to indicate that the “fan effect”
remains in play. Although these fan investors may be misguided, as long as teams are able to
continue to raise substantial funds without any significant loss of voting rights, ownership, or

48

GB Packers Shareholder History, supra note 30.
GB Packers Community, Shareholders, supra note 11.
50
Makan, supra note 11. Another consideration is that the entire IPO market did not fare well in 2012. Without the
Facebook IPO, which had proceeds around $16 billion, the U.S. IPO market proceeds were the lowest they have
been since the height of the financial crisis. Thomas Zadvydas, After Tough Year for IPOs, Bankers Expect Active
2013, THE DEAL PIPELINE, (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.thedeal.com/content/tmt/after-tough-year-for-ipos-bankersexpect-active-2013.php. This slow-down in the market may have depressed the Manchester United IPO proceeds.
51
See infra Section III for an in depth look at the dual-class voting structure.
52
Manchester
United
IPO’s
on
NYSE,
CBC
NEWS,
BUSINESS,
(Aug.
10,
2012),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2012/08/10/manchester-united-ipo.html.
53
See Smith, supra note 13 (“If you are planning to buy Manchester United stock, you may want to think again. …
Shares in Manchester United might be a nice piece of merchandise for lifelong fans of the Red Devils, but history
suggests that there is little reason to believe that it is actually a good investment.”); Kim Peterson, The Manchester
United IPO Stinks, MSN MONEY, (Aug. 8, 2012), http://money.msn.com/top-stocks/post.aspx?post=7638d1df-b3cb483d-adae-4c943adbabcc (“Think the Facebook IPO was bad? Get a load of Manchester United, which will go
public Friday. This is a first-class stinker.”); Damian Reece, Manchester United’s glory days on the stock market are
behind
it,
THE
TELEGRAPH,
(July
4,
2012),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/damianreece/9375912/Manchester-Uniteds-glory-days-on-the-stockmarket-are-behind-it.html (“Ultimately the float seems to be an attempt by the Glazers to raise some cash to pay
down its £423.2m of debt – hardly an appealing prospect for investors. While Man Utd may continue as a force on
the pitch, its glory days as a stock market darling appear behind it.”); David Larrabee, Manchester United IPO:
Yellow
Card,
ENTERPRISING
INVESTOR,
CFA
INSTITUTE,
(Aug.
8,
2012)
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2012/08/08/manchester-uniteds-ipo-gets-a-yellow-card/ (“While the team’s
iconic brand and loyal following are probably unsurpassed in professional sports, the valuation attached to United’s
shares and the risk factors associated with ownership suggest that investors are likely better off sitting this one out
on the sidelines.”).
49
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other adverse effects to the primary owners, some sports teams will continue to offer stock
publicly.

b. Disadvantages to Going Public for Sports Teams
There are also market factors at play that discourage sports teams from going public.
One concern is that the goal of obtaining success “on the field” can be at odds with financial
success.54 When the team remains in private hands, the owners are perfectly within their rights
to favor “on the field success.” However, once there are shareholders in the mix, directors of the
company must consider the desire of the investors for profit or face the legal consequences.55
For this reason, fans have expressed fears that IPOs will harm their team’s ability to win.
According to Brian Cheffins, fans fear that because “[i]nvestors will demand a hard-nosed
attitude toward money matters, team executive will feel compelled to sacrifice playing success, if
this is required to save costs and increase profits available to shareholders.”56 Although Cheffins
notes that there is no actual evidence of this,57 the sentiment remains with fans.58 Fans also fear
increased ticket and merchandise prices resulting from a need to increase shareholder profits,

54

For example, while not publicly traded, London professional football club Arsenal has consistently focused on
financial stability and success to the detriment of their on the field success over the past few years. Arsenal Chief
Executive Denies ‘Ruining the Club’ with Financial Focus, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 25, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/oct/25/arsenal-chief-executive-denies-ruining-club.
55
In most cases, owners do not owe fiduciary duties to fans, however these duties will arise to shareholders once the
team goes public. Schaffer, supra note 8, at 227. The Board of Directors will owe “the duty of loyalty [which]
involves conflicts of interest for decision-makers, [and] . . . the duty of care [which] involves the procedure by
which the board makes decisions.” Id. In most cases where the Board does not have a conflict of interest and has
gathered some information, the courts will uphold the decision under the “business judgment rule.” Id. at 227-28.
The business judgment rule “gives directors broad discretion to take actions which, after careful consideration, they
deem to be in the best interests of the company.” Id. If the original owners remain the majority shareholders after
the IPO, they may also owe fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders. Id.
56
Cheffins, supra note 2, at 288.
57
Id. at 289.
58
It is also possible that this fear drives the “fan-investor” phenomenon; fans may believe that if they are the
shareholders of their team, they can encourage “on the field” success.
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which Cheffins has also found no evidence of in practice.59 Nonetheless, fans have maintained
these fears. 60
Even if teams find they are able to balance on and off the field success, they still must
face other consequences of IPOs like legal disclosure obligations.61 Disclosure obligations
subject teams to unwanted publicity about financials, which can take the focus away from the
team itself.62 As previously discussed, the most financially-sound decision may be at odds with
the decision that helps a team win. Publicly traded teams may avoid making decisions that do
not benefit the financial health of the organization, perhaps to the detriment of the team’s ability
to win, because these decisions are made public.63 Recent legislation, in the form of the JOBS
Act, changes these disclosure rules for some and may negate this downside of IPOs, at least in
the short term.64
American disclosure obligations have been noted to deter teams from going public in the
U.S.65 Before the JOBS Act, if a company wanted to issue stock it had to either register with the

59

Cheffins, supra note 2, at 289. In fact, Cheffins has found that fans have benefitted, because when you alienate
customers, profits fall and shareholders lose – so really, the publicly traded team may need to cater more to the fans
then when it is privately held. Id.
60
In their article entitled “Do Football Clubs Benefit from Initial Public Offerings?” Dirk Baur and Conor
McKeating discuss the effect of an IPO on a football club. They note that there are two distinct reasons for a team
to IPO: to maximize either profits or wins. Those that look to maximize profits will use the profits from the IPO to
reduce debt or otherwise financially restructure the team. Those that look to maximize wins will spend the profits
on productive assets, either players or stadia. Baur and McKeating’s research indicates that most teams are profitmaximizers, as there is no change in performance after their IPOs. Their conclusion is that IPOs do not improve
“on-the-pitch” performance, excepting for lower division clubs in large leagues. Dirk Baur & Conor McKeating, Do
Football Clubs Benefit from Initial Public Offerings?, 6 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. VOL. 1, 40 (Feb. 2011). This indicates
that while the IPO does not necessarily improve the performance of the team, the fan’s fear that the IPO will harm
the team is not shown.
61
There are also costs associated with IPOs. For example, a $5 million IPO might cost ~$700k. Cheffins, supra
note 2, at 280. There are administrative burdens, like maintain registers of shareholders for proxy and voting
purposes as well as paperwork associated with disclosure requirements, that continue after IPO is complete. Id. at
281. These costs however are not specific to Sports IPOs, but rather are faced by all publicly traded companies.
62
Id. at 280.
63
This is not necessarily a bad thing; however it is certainly a factor to consider when examining the limited number
of stock market teams.
64
See infra Section II for further discussion of the JOBS Act.
65
Cheffins, supra note 2, at 280.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or it had to meet a registration exemption.66 The
most commonly used of these exemptions are Rule 50667 and Rule 144A.68 Rule 506 allows the
company to make an offering to an unlimited amount of accredited investors plus 35 nonaccredited investors.69 Rule 144A allows a company to resell stock to qualified institutional
buyers (QIBs) without registration.70

Neither of these exceptions allowed for general

solicitations.71 Companies were also very hesitant to violate these rules, as doing so would
provide investors with a right of recession, or ability to avoid the purchase.72 As a result,
companies often would only engage in private offerings and were very restrictive with their
publicity.73 Because privately-held companies in the U.S. are subject to very little disclosure
obligations, IPOs do not appear very attractive.74
Finally, many North American sports leagues have restricted their teams’ ability to go
public. Over the past few decades only a handful of teams throughout North American sports
leagues have been publicly traded.75 Each league has varying levels of restrictions, with no

66

Latham & Watkins, The JOBS Act, Part Deux: Frequently Asked Questions About Title II of the JOBS Act, Client
Alert No. 1439, 1, 12/13/2012, www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/faq-jobs-act-title-II [hereinafter FAQ about Title II
of JOBS Act].
67
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011).
68
17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2011).
69
FAQ about Title II of JOBS Act, supra note 66; 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2011) ( “(2) Specific conditions (i)
Limitation on number of purchasers. There are no more than or the issuer reasonably believes that there are no more
than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer in any offering under this section. NOTE: See § 230.501(e) for the
calculation of the number of purchasers and § 230.502(a) for what may or may not constitute an offering under this
section.”) ; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2011) (“(e) Calculation of number of purchasers. For purposes of calculating the
number of purchasers under §§ 230.505(b) and 230.506(b) only, the following shall apply: (1) The following
purchasers shall be excluded … (iv) Any accredited investor.”).
70
Id. A qualified institutional buyer is one of a number of specifically delineated entities, listed in 17 C.F.R. §
230.144A(a)(1) (2011).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. (“No one wants to violate Securities Act Section 5, which would give investors a right of rescission or “put”
remedy. This harsh result has led to very restrictive publicity practices in private offerings in order to minimize the
risk that the offering would fail to qualify as exempt from registration.”).
74
Cheffins, supra note 2, at 279-80.
75
Id. at 272-73.
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major sports league completely permitting public offerings.76 Courts have acknowledged that
policies limiting public ownership do contribute to the leagues’ ability to function effectively as
it avoids a conflict of interest between shareholder goals and the league.77
The National Hockey League (NHL) has limited public offerings by mandating that one
shareholder within the organization must have ultimate voting control.78 Additionally, “teams
cannot pay cash dividends unless they maintain adequate cash reserves and can meet the
following year’s expenses without long-term debt financing.”79

These rules limit both the

amount of shares NHL teams could offer as well as the attractiveness of an investment that has a
cash dividend restricted in such a manner.
The National Football League (NFL) has a non-codified but pervasive blanket prohibition
on teams being publicly traded. The NFL rules prohibit corporate ownership of franchises as
well.80 To block potential IPOs, the NFL makes a change in ownership to a multitude of
shareholders extremely difficult, as it requires three-quarters of all owners to approve all
transfers of ownership interests.81 The only team able to get around these rules and issue shares
to the public is the Green Bay Packers, because the team had been doing so prior to the

Id. at 279 (“North American professional sports leagues have policies regulating the transfer of ownership of
teams, and owners typically have been discouraged from selling a stake in their teams to the public.”).
77
Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1102 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Finally, we accept the NFL's claim that its
public ownership policy contributes to the ability of the NFL to function as an effective sports league, and that the
NFL's functioning would be impaired if publicly owned teams were permitted, because the short-term dividend
interests of a club's shareholder would often conflict with the long-term interests of the league as a whole. That is,
the policy avoids a detrimental conflict of interests between team shareholders and the league.”).
78
Cheffins, supra note 2, at 279.
79
Bacon, supra note 4, at 144 n. 27 (citing Scott C. Lascari, The Latest Revenue Generator: Stock Sales by
Professional Sports Franchises, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 445 (1999)).
80
Cheffins, supra note 2, at 279. This practice is very typical across the other major sports leagues in the U.S. See
note 5 for a current list of teams owned by publicly traded companies. See also PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
SPORT MANAGEMENT (Lisa Masteralexis et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012) (“The NFL has the most strict ownership rules. It
is the only league to prohibit corporate ownership of its franchises, which it has done since 1970.”). The NFL also
used to ban cross-ownership, or ownership of more than one sports franchise. Id. It has relaxed those rules, now
allowing “an NFL owner to own other sports franchises in the same market or own an NFL franchise in one market
and another franchise in another market, provided that market has no NFL team.” Id.
81
Id.
76
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introduction of these NFL rules and was therefore grandfathered in.82 There have been many
challenges to the NFL rules, with the NFL facing many allegations of antitrust violations for this
ban against public offerings as well as other NFL rules.83 As a result, it is not clear that the NFL
would be able to successfully challenge a team’s public offering in court.
Major League Baseball (MLB) also limits the amount of ownership share that can be
issued to the public, requiring that there be at least one majority shareholder in the
organization.84 The MLB also restricts voting rights.85 Additionally, the MLB is the only major
North American sports league to have a federal antitrust exception granted by the Supreme Court
of the United States as it was found not to be a business in Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore
v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs.86 This is problematic, as challenges to
limits on public offerings have been based in antitrust law, finding a league violated antitrust law
by controlling individual teams’ ability to sell stock to the public.87 This makes it harder for
baseball teams to challenge going public restrictions in court, at least on an antitrust basis.
Once a sports team has determined that going public is in its best interest, it must decide
where its stock will be traded. The combination of the JOBS Act, a dual-class voting structure
and the recently successful Manchester United IPO makes the U.S. markets an apparent choice.

II.

JOBS Act Advantages for Sports IPOs

82

Bacon, supra note 4, at 145. The Packers have issued stock in 1923, 1935, 1950, 1997, and 2011. GB Packers
Community, Shareholders, supra note 11. See also Birren, supra note 47, at 139.
83
See, e.g. Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994), Murray v. Nat. Football League, 1996
WL 363911 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1996), Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010), St. Louis
Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998). See also infra Section IV:
Changing Landscape of League Restrictions for further commentary on Sullivan and American Needle.
84
Bacon, supra note 4, at 145.
85
Id.
86
Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also Birren,
supra note 47, at 124.
87
See infra Section IV: Changing Landscape of League Restrictions for further commentary on Sullivan and
American Needle.
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The JOBS Act was enacted in 2012 to “increase American job creation and economic
growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”88 It
creates the concept of Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) which are defined as issuers of
stock with less than $1 billion in gross annual revenue.89 The JOBS Act revises the Securities
Act of 1933 (’33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (’34 Act)90 to ease IPO
restrictions for small businesses.91 An EGC will retain its status for five years unless its gross
annual revenue exceeds $1 billion, more than $1 billion in non-convertible debt is issued over a
three year period, or the issuer is considered a large accelerated filer under 17 CFR 240.12b–2.92
EGCs are also exempt from requirements for executive compensation shareholder approval of
both say-on-pay rules and golden parachute compensation. 93

JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS ACT, PL 112-106, April 5, 2012, 126 Stat 306 (hereinafter “JOBS Act”).
15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(19).
90
JOBS ACT, supra note 88.
91
“[The JOBS Act] is a legislative package that we believe will help jump-start our economy by creating new
growth opportunities for America's small businesses, for start-up companies, and for entrepreneurs.” 158 CONG.
REC. H1234-01 (March 7, 2012) (statement by Rep. Bachus).
92
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19) (“The term ‘emerging growth company’ means an issuer that had total annual gross
revenues of less than $1,000,000,000 … an issuer that is an emerging growth company as of the first day of that
fiscal year shall continue to be deemed an emerging growth company until the earliest of-“(A) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer during which it had total annual gross revenues of $1,000,000,000
(as such amount is indexed for inflation every 5 years by the Commission to reflect the change in the Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, setting the threshold to the nearest
1,000,000) or more;
“(B) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer following the fifth anniversary of the date of the first sale of common
equity securities of the issuer pursuant to an effective registration statement under this title;
“(C) the date on which such issuer has, during the previous 3–year period, issued more than $1,000,000,000 in nonconvertible debt; or
“(D) the date on which such issuer is deemed to be a ‘large accelerated filer’, as defined in section 240.12b–2 of title
17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto.”).
93
15 U.S.C. § 78n–1(2) Treatment of Emerging Growth Companies (A) In General.--An emerging growth company
shall be exempt from the requirements of subsections (a) and (b). JOBS Act, PL 112-106, April 5, 2012, 126 Stat
306. Subsections (a) and (b) of § 78n–1 contain both say-on-pay rules (§ 78n-1(a)) and golden parachute executive
compensation rules (§ 78n-1(b)):
(a) Separate resolution required. (1) In general: Not less frequently than once every 3 years, a
proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the
proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require compensation disclosure shall include a
separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives, as
disclosed pursuant to section 229.402 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor
thereto.
88
89

Page | 16

a. Manchester United and the JOBS Act
The legislative record on the JOBS Act does not indicate that Manchester United was the
type of company the law was aimed towards. Instead, a sponsor of the bill explained,
…As a small business owner, I know that it's tough to get access to capital. If a
company doesn't have the resources it needs to grow and expand, then it's
virtually impossible to hire new workers. … H.R. 3606, [] would make it easier
for companies to access capital markets and ease the overwhelming regulations
that these young businesses encounter.94
Throughout its legislative record, the JOBS Act is continually touted as a bill aimed to
help small businesses and start-ups.95
As a company with less than $1 billion in revenue96 that had not gone public in the U.S.
before December 2011, Manchester United qualifies as an EGC.97 Manchester United is not the
picture of “emerging growth,” as it is neither small nor young. Formed in 1892,98 self-described
as “one of the most popular and successful sports teams in the world,”99 most would not consider

(b) Shareholder approval of golden parachute compensation. (1) Disclosure: …[T]he person
making such solicitation shall disclose in the proxy or consent solicitation material, … any
agreements or understandings that such person has with any named executive officers of such
issuer … concerning any type of compensation … that is based on or otherwise relates to the
acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets
of the issuer and the aggregate total of all such compensation that may … be paid or become
payable to or on behalf of such executive officer.
15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (emphasis added).
94
157 CONG. REC. H9801-01 (Dec. 16, 2011) (statement by Rep. Dold) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the House
Report on the JOBS Act says, “[t]o encourage small companies to go public in the U.S., to spur economic growth,
and to create jobs, Representatives Fincher and Carney introduced H.R. 3606 on December 8, 2011.” H.R. 406,
112th Cong. (2012). H.R. 3606 would go on to become the JOBS Act.
95
For example, Rep. Hurt described the JOBS Act as a bill that “collectively reduces burdens that prevent small
businesses from accessing the capital necessary to hire and expand, and it encourages our entrepreneurs to get their
start-ups off the ground.” 158 CONG. REC. H1234-01 (March 7, 2012).
96
“Total revenue for the years ended June 30, 2009, 2010 and 2011 was £278.5 million, £286.4 million and
£331.4 million, respectively.” Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 3.
97
Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 7.
98
Murphy, supra note 31, at 437.
99
Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 1. Manchester United also had a total indebtedness of
£423.3 million as of March 31, 2012. Manchester United Prospectus, supra note 18, at 29.
Page | 17

Manchester United to be the “start-up” company that the JOBS Act was looking to aid.100
Nonetheless, Congress chose to set the limits very high. 101
So although it may not have been Congress’ intent to include companies like Manchester
United in the EGC category, it does open up a great window of opportunity for many sports
organizations. For example, in 2010, Forbes released a list of financial information for Major
League Baseball teams, including annual revenues for 2009.102 Atop this list was the New York
Yankees, with revenues of $441 million103 – less than half of the maximum revenue allowed to
an EGC. This demonstrates that as of 2009, all MLB teams would be eligible for EGC status if
they chose to go public in the U.S. – no team would be excluded, as none were already public as
of December 8, 2011.104 Similarly, all NHL teams would be eligible for EGC status if they were

According to its sponsors, the JOBS Act “will create jobs and grow the economy.” 158 CONG. REC. H906-05
(Feb. 17, 2012) (statement by Rep. Carney). It is unclear how the IPO of Manchester United will do either. Instead,
by instituting such high maximum thresholds, Congress invited many businesses to IPO in the U.S. and profit from
the system without providing much, if any, benefit to the American public.
101
Congress did consider two amendments to the JOBS Act that would have lowered the gross annual revenue cap
to $750k and require EGCs to comply with say-on-pay and golden parachute shareholder votes, however both were
voted down. 158 CONG. REC. D204-01 (March 7, 2012). (Himes amendment “sought to lower the gross annual
revenue cap from $1,000,000,000 to $750,000,000 for emerging growth companies to remain eligible for the
regulatory on-ramp and strike the public float requirement for the on-ramp” was voted down by 81 votes and Ellison
amendment “sought to require Emerging Growth Companies to fully comply with say-on-pay and golden parachute
shareholder votes” was voted down by 75 votes. Rep. Himes testified in front of the House regarding the $1 billion
maximum stating,
[M]y belief is that this is far too expansive a definition of emerging growth companies. It's not just
my belief. We heard in the hearing which we held on this bill from Mr. LeBlanc that something
more like $250 million to $500 million in revenues would be appropriate. I offered in committee
the notion similar to this amendment that we make the cap $750 million in revenues. … It's hard
to know-a billion dollars in revenue is an abstraction. Let me give you an example. I have a list of
the IPOs that have occurred in the last couple of years. Currently, what I think of as a fine
company, Spirit Airlines, with some $800 million in revenues, would qualify as an emerging
growth company. They went public in May of 2011.Spirit Airlines is an established airline with
2,400 employees. They clearly are a company that has the capability to comply with the full array
of protections that are there for investors and others. … I think $750 million in revenue is a more
appropriate benchmark and, therefore, I propose this amendment.
158 CONG. REC. H1234-01 (March 7, 2012).
102
The Business of Baseball, FORBES, (April 7, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/33/baseball-valuations10_The-Business-Of-Baseball_Revenue.html.
103
Id.
104
JOBS ACT, supra note 88. The Green Bay Packers are the only major North American sports team that would be
excluded by this provision, as they are currently public in the United States and have been since 1923. GB Packers
Community, Shareholders, supra note 11.
100
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to go public in the U.S., as the team with the highest revenues is the Toronto Maple Leafs with
$200 million in revenue in 2012.105
One downside to the JOBS Act for sports teams is that the EGC status is not permanent.
Even if the sports team remains below the $1 billion maximum gross annual revenue and meets
the other qualifications, after five years the team will lose its EGC status and will be forced to
comply with disclosure obligations mandated by the ’33 and ’34 Act.106
Although the team could elect to go private at that point and avoid disclosure, the process
of going private is not as simple as going public under the JOBS Act.107 In order to take a
company private, the shareholders must be limited to three hundred or eliminated altogether.108
The most common ways to do this are through: a cash-out merger, a tender offer, a reverse stock
split that leaves minority shareholders with fractional shares, or a sale of all or substantially all of
the assets of the company.109 However each of these methods requires planning and implicates
many regulations, as well as fiduciary duties, that teams will not wish to violate.110 Going
public, especially for a company that can take advantage of the JOBS Act, is much easier and
cleaner than is often the case when going private. As such, many sports teams may not be
105

NHL Team Values: The Business of Hockey, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/nhl-valuations/list/ (last visited
Mar. 11, 2013).
106
JOBS ACT, supra note 88.
107
It can also be legally messy. For example, throughout the 1960’s the New England Patriots (then the Boston
Patriots) were privately owned by ten shareholders, with the owner of the franchise William Sullivan as the
president. Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (1986). By the mid-1970s,
however, Sullivan had been ousted from the presidency and began buying up shares from other shareholders in order
to regain control of the corporation. Id. He was ultimately successful and proceeded to create a new corporation
(New Patriots) and merge the existing corporation (Old Patriots) into it. Id. at 1115. As a result, the voting stock of
the Old Patriots was extinguished and non-voting stock was cashed out for $15 a share. Id. This resulted in a
number of lawsuits. In Coggins, shareholders who voted against the merger sought its undoing. In another suit,
Sarrouf v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1122 (1986), non-voting shareholders challenged
the $15 per share price and sought to have the court determine fair value of their shares. Finally, in Pavlidis v. New
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227, 1229 (1st Cir. 1984), a class of shareholders who initially voted
to accept the $15 share price offer brought suit arguing they had been induced to accept the offer by a misleading
proxy statement. Although in this case the Patriots were not publicly traded, each of these suits could result from a
going private transaction.
108
Gregory R. Samuel & Sally A. Schreiber, Going Private Transactions, 40 TEX. J. BUS. L., 85, 89 (2004).
109
Samuel & Schreiber, supra note 108, at 89.
110
Id. at 91.
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swayed by the JOBS Act alone, knowing that in five years it will either have to go private or be
subject to the disclosure rules of the ’33 and ’34 Acts.
Although some teams may be so strapped for cash in the present that they will ignore
these future disclosure obligations, others which are able to better consider the long term effects
of going public in the U.S. may be deterred by this five-year EGC status limit. When the JOBS
Act is considered in combination with the dual-class voting structure of the U.S., however, teams
may be more willing to go public.

b. Other Recent IPOs and the JOBS Act
Numerous non-sports teams have also taken advantage of the JOBS Act. Throughout
2012, sixty-one companies went public as EGCs under the JOBS Act, while thirty large
ineligible companies went public without the benefits of the JOBS Act.111 Interestingly, the
shares of U.S. companies that went public using the JOBS Act outperformed shares in companies
that did not or could not utilize the JOBS Act.112 On average, shares in companies utilizing the
JOBS Act have risen 28.9% from their initial offer price, whereas non-JOBS Act companies’
Olivia Oran, IPO VIEW – U.S. Jobs Act Companies Outperform Other IPOs, Data Shows, Reuters (Jan. 25,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/25/jobs-act-ipos-idUSL1N0ARB2C20130125. Some of the
companies that filed as emerging growth companies, in addition to Manchester United, were Legal Zoom, LifeLock,
Tumi and Bright Horizons. Becky Yerak, JOBS Act Intended to Help Workforce Grow, But Investor Advocates
Have Concerns, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, (Dec. 9, 2012), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-1209/business/ct-biz-1209-emerging-companies--20121209_1_jobs-act-investor-advocates-growth-companies. An
issue that has arisen regarding emerging growth companies is the idea of “blank-check” or special-purpose
acquisition companies. These are basically shell companies that file without any employees or operations, but are
created in order to allow current privately held companies to go public through a reverse merger. Emily Chasan,
Meet the JOBS Act’s Jobs-Free Companies, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, (June 4, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303506404577443980893828956.html. Many have cited concerns
that these “blank check” companies will actually result in investor fraud, rather than job creation. For example, the
very first company to file under the JOBS Act as an EGC, Caribbean Pacific Marketing, was a “blank check”
company. Interestingly, Caribeean Pacific Marketing was not even a company prior to its filing. Instead, it hoped to
use the funds from the IPO to start the business. The company was shortly thereafter charged by the SEC with
fraud, stemming from inaccuracies in the prospectus. Though it is unclear whether the advantages of the JOBS Act
influenced the company to commit fraud, it is clear that emerging growth companies may not all be the job creators
that the JOBS Act was supposed to aid. Floyd Norris, Fraud Case Delayed By 2 Months, NY TIMES, (Nov. 1,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/business/sec-charges-company-that-filed-under-jobs-act-withfraud.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
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shares have only risen 13.1%.113 Although there may be other factors at play, like the relative
newness of the JOBS Act and the positive trends of the U.S. stock markets,114 this data shows
both that companies are utilizing the JOBS Act and that their stocks have not been held back as a
result.
One of the most anticipated IPOs of 2013 is that of Gilt Groupe, an online luxury retailer.
Although valued at $1 billion in May 2012, with revenues in 2011 of $370 million, it would
qualify under the JOBS Act.115

Conversely, some of the biggest IPOs of this past year,

specifically Facebook, did not take advantage of the JOBS Act. Facebook was ineligible for the
JOBS Act as a result of its revenues, which totaled over $3.7 billion in 2011.116
Like sports teams, other corporations might not be swayed to go public in the U.S. by the
JOBS Act alone, particularly due to its five-year time limit on certain disclosures. However, like
Manchester United, other companies may find that when the JOBS Act benefits are combined
with the dual-class voting structure in the U.S., that the U.S. market is the preferred market
location for initial public offerings.

III.

Dual-Class Voting Structure and Maintaining Owner Control

Before going public, sports teams are typically owned and managed by a relatively small
number of individuals. On the whole, these owners will want to preserve their existing power
when going public. A dual-class voting structure allows the pre-IPO owners to retain their
voting strength by allowing new stock to have significantly less voting power per share.
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A dual-class voting structure provide companies with an opportunity to raise capital
without altering the control of current owners.117 A class of “super-voting” stock118 is distributed
to current owners, while creating another class of stock with diminished voting rights to be sold
in the public offering.119 Because public investors are aware of this inequitable structure from
the outset, a dual-class voting structure is not considered to be disenfranchising when used in a
initial public offering.120 Instead, under the efficient capital markets hypothesis,121 the market
should take this aspect of the shares into account and adjust the price of the share accordingly.122
Often, it is the founder and/or creator that wishes to maintain creative control over the
company that employs a dual-class voting structure. This structure has been utilized in recent
IPOs like Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn, where the owners of the company argue they need to
protect the company’s public mission123 and focus on long term goals without being subject to
short-term market fluctuations and changes of course that can result.124 However, there is no
indication in the Manchester United IPO that the pre-IPO owners, the Glazer family, provide
Manchester United with such unique and integral leadership that it must be protected at the
117
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expense of the public investors. Nor is there a great concern that public investors will change
Manchester United in such a way that conflicts with its public mission. It is more likely that the
Glazer family is simply unwilling to relinquish any significant amount of control. However,
because motivation is not relevant under U.S. law, the Glazer family was free to impose a dualclass voting structure on the IPO.
Although there does not appear to be anything extraordinary about the Glazers’
leadership of Manchester United to suggest a dual-class voting structure was necessary,125 many
sports teams would and should find this option attractive. As previously stated, one fear about
taking a sports team public is that “on the field” success will be sacrificed for financial success
by those investors uninterested in the team’s record at the end of its season.126 While there is
reason to question this fear, as it is clear that teams that are successful “on the field” can earn
additional revenues, perhaps secure better sponsorships and other financial benefits that stem
from success, the dual-class voting structure can put current owners and fans at ease and cause
them to be more willing to go public. Because the managers’ fiduciary duties to not require them
to always put profit over the team’s “on the field” success, those managers put in place by the
existing owners, who retain control under this structure, may be more willing to balance the two
concerns as compared to managers elected by investors solely looking to profit.
In the Manchester United IPO, the Glazer family was able to retain 98% of the voting
share127 of the stock while issuing approximately 10% of the shares.128 They were able to do this

Bennett, supra note 16 (“Andy Green, a football finance blogger, explained, ‘Larry Page and Sergey Brin built
Google from nothing into one of the world's greatest companies with their unique vision. There is nothing unique
about the Glazers that necessitates their control of United has to be uniquely preserved.’”).
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128
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because under the dual-class voting structure, Class B shares, owned by the Glazer family,
received ten votes per share, while Class A shares, the only shares available to public investors,
only received one vote per share.129 Of the 16.6 million Class A shares issued,130 American
billionaire George Soros purchased a 7.85% stake, or approximately 3.1 million shares.131 This
gives Soros a 1.9% stake in the club,132 however there is no immediate concern regarding Soros’
acquisition, although large. Because Class A shares have such a diminished voting power, Soros
essentially comes away with no voting power and, additionally, no immediate financial benefits
as Manchester United does not issue dividends.133
Many markets around the world do not allow this type of voting-right inequity. Neither
the U.K. nor Hong Kong markets allow a dual-class voting structure and as a result neither was
chosen as the forum for the Manchester United IPO.134 The fact that Manchester United chose
not to IPO in the U.K. or Hong Kong, both of which were more natural markets for the team than

The Glazer Family owns all Class B stock. Class A stock was issued in the IPO. “The rights of the holders of
our Class A ordinary shares and our Class B ordinary shares are identical, except with respect to voting and
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the U.S.,135 strongly indicates that the dual-class voting structure was high on Manchester
United’s list of priorities.136

IV.

Changing Landscape of League Restrictions

Over the past two decades, sports leagues have faced many antitrust challenges from
players, teams within the leagues, suppliers, and others.

Antitrust challenges have fought

restrictions against going public, exclusive manufacturing and sale licenses, and required central
contracting with league, among other things. Many of these challenges have weakened the
position of the leagues to control the individual actions of sports teams. Alone, these are likely
not enough to compel sports teams to challenge the league restrictions in court. However, with
the availability of the dual-class voting structure and the JOBS Act, teams may determine that it
is in their best interest to fight the leagues on these restrictions.
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In 1994, in Sullivan v. National Football League, an antitrust claim was brought by thenowner of the New England Patriots, William Sullivan, regarding the NFL policy against public
offerings by teams.137 Sullivan argued that the policy depressed competition and forced him to
sell the team at a much lower price to a private buyer than if he had been able to list the team
publicly.138 The NFL defended its policy, arguing that “NFL's functioning would be impaired if
publicly owned teams were permitted, because the short-term dividend interests of a club's
shareholder would often conflict with the long-term interests of the league as a whole.”139 It was
the NFL’s position that this rule helped to avoid a conflict of interest between the league and
team shareholders.140 Sullivan in return proposed options to the outright ban on public offerings,
suggesting sales of nonvoting stock, restricting individuals’ holdings, and allowing the NFL to
control dividends, among other things.141
The Sullivan court determined that a reasonable jury could find that the NFL policy
against public offerings harmed team owners by restricting the sale of teams to private buyers.142
This ruling will be key in any future challenges to league restrictions on public offerings of
stock. The court also found that the teams of the NFL did not constitute a single enterprise, a
137
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finding necessary for an antitrust challenge, because the individual teams “compete with each
other, both on and off the field, for things like fan support, players, coaches, ticket sales, local
broadcast revenues, and the sale of team paraphernalia.”143

The court ruled that actual

competition among the teams need not be demonstrated, as long as potential for competition
exists.144 This is important, as the type of competition identified in Sullivan was “competition
for the sale of ownership interests”145 which is not easy to show evidence of when the leagues
prohibit this type of competition to varying degrees.146
Some of the language of Sullivan was reiterated under American Needle, Inc. v. National
Football League in 2010.147 In American Needle, manufacturers of sportswear for various
professional sports teams brought an antitrust suit against the NFL for granting an exclusive
licensing agreement to a competitor.148 Although the case does not reference the ability of NFL
teams to conduct public offerings, it does further establish the proposition that sports leagues and
teams do not operate as a single enterprise and therefore are subject to antitrust law.149
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The NFL line of cases is so important because the NFL is the only league with a total,
although not codified, bar to public ownership. All of the other major sports leagues allow at
least some opportunities for public offerings, albeit with restrictions. Affirmative findings that
the NFL cannot restrict public offerings would benefit legal challenges for other leagues as well.

V.

Manchester United Since the IPO
In order to determine the short team effects150 of the IPO on August 10, 2012, the stock

price of the Manchester United shares, the financial opportunities available to the team, and the
“on the field” success of the team should be examined. As demonstrated below, all three
indicate that the IPO has not harmed, and even perhaps has helped, the team in the short run.
After opening at $14, a price much lower than initially hoped for,151 the Manchester
United stock rose slightly for two days before it began to fall.152 Traded under the stock symbol
MANU, the press called the IPO “a disappointment.”153 By September 13, it reached its lowest
point, at $12.00.154 However, since late October 2012, the MANU shares have begun to climb,
surpassing the $17.00 mark on January 24, 2013.155 As a result of the late-January share price
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increase, Manchester United’s enterprise value156 has reached $3.3 billion, making it the most
valuable team in the world.157

158

As indicated in the graph above, the MANU stock has outperformed the S&P 500 (in red), the
Dow Jones (in green) and the NASDAQ (in brown) since mid-December 2012. Although the
Manchester United stock has dropped off from its high on February 19, 2013 of $18.82,159 it has
remained well above the above-mentioned benchmarks of the market.160 As the share price
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increases, so does investor confidence in the brand, which can affect other aspects of the sports
franchise, such as other financial opportunities. Although the initial downturn was certainly
cause for concern, if the share price continues to rise, this should encourage owners of other
sports franchises to seriously consider an IPO in the U.S.
Manchester United has made headlines in early 2013 with news of new sponsorships in
both China and Japan.161 The team signed a three-year sponsorship deal with Wahaha Group
Co., the largest beverage producer in China, making it the official soft drinks partner in China,162
a three-year deal with China Construction Bank, entitling the bank to produce official
Manchester United credit cards in China,163 and a three-year deal with Kansai Paint Co. Ltd. to
make the company the official paint partner of Manchester United.164

These sponsorships

project confidence in the brand of Manchester United and argue in favor of IPO success.
The “on the field” success of the Manchester United team has continued since the IPO as
well. As of March 8, 2013, Manchester United leads the English Premier League with 71
points.165 With over two-thirds of the season completed,166 Manchester United appears poised to
remain in the top four positions in the Premier League, which would allow them to qualify for
the UEFA Champions League. This is the goal of every team in the Premier League. If the team
remains on course, fans will be hard-pressed to find fault with the August IPO.
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With an increasing share price, lucrative sponsorship agreements, and impressive “on the
field” success, there is no indication that the Manchester United IPO has in anyway hurt the
team. It is likely that other sports franchises may see the Manchester United IPO as having
improved the success of the franchise. If so, this could sway owners considering an IPO for their
franchise in the future.

Conclusion

As the economy begins to recover slowly from the recent recession of 2008, things may
never return to normal for sports teams. Cities will likely be much more resistant to handing out
millions of dollars for new stadiums or even repairs on older stadiums. This may force teams to
look within themselves in order to raise the necessary funds, leading to more sports IPOs.
Additionally, if players’ salary demands continue to rise, teams may be forced to look beyond
revenues to public offerings to satisfy these demands. Finally, as the public becomes more
conscious of debt and financial practices after the recession, North American teams might face
legislation like that of the UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules, driving teams to IPO in order to
balance out their debts and equities. All of these factors will cause sports teams to look to the
public for funds, which could lead to a rise in sports IPOs.
Once teams decide to go public, they will choose to do so in the U.S. because of the
JOBS Act, the dual-class voting structure and the developments in antitrust law regarding sports
league restrictions. It is possible that North American teams will be hesitant to wade into the
publicly traded arena even with the JOBS Act, the dual-class voting structure and changing
landscape of antitrust legislation. This may require a few more foreign teams, like Manchester
United who are not held back by league restrictions, to IPO in the U.S. and make the option look
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more attractive to owners. However, as long as both the JOBS Act and the dual-class voting
structure remain in place, and some teams are willing to challenge their respective leagues in
court, sports IPOs in the U.S. will rise in the coming years.
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